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David Z. Saltz 
The jacket notes for Michael Goldman's Acting and Action in Shake-
spearean Tragedy advertise that the book represents a "new approach to the 
study of action in drama." The generally good reviews that the book has 
received suggest that, by and large, the critical community has accepted this 
assessment.1 Harry Berger, Jr., whose work differs from Goldman's in 
significant ways, nonetheless asserts that he follows Goldman in employing this 
new critical approach, which he dubs "textual dramaturgy" (Textual Dramatur-
gy, 135). Goldman attempts to formulate an interpretive strategy that features 
textual action over semantic content. By analyzing this attempt closely, I hope 
to clarify both the project's importance and some of its difficulties, and to 
place it within a broader critical perspective. Goldman's book, published in 
1985, is a paradigmatic critical document of its time. It employs a Janus-faced 
strategy that looks both forward and back, manifesting exciting possibilities, but 
at the same time resting on assumptions that prevent those possibilities from 
being realized. Hence, the book offers itself as a valuable case study in 
interpretive methodogy, one that can help illuminate the critical landscape 
ahead of us as we enter the '90s. 
The basis of Goldman's approach is simple and elegant. The approach 
takes as its point of departure the theatrical performance of Shakespeare's 
texts. Specifically, Goldman is concerned with the problems that specific roles 
pose to actors. Goldman's primary contention is that the difficulties an actor 
encounters in trying to do what the text requires reflect the difficulties that the 
character encounters within the text itself. As Goldman explains, "each great 
Shakespearean role seems to have its defining set of acting problems and 
rewards, and these bear a very suggestive relation to the larger business of the 
play. The problems which confront the actor who plays Hamlet, for example, 
are very similar to those which confront the Prince in making sense of life at 
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Elsinore" (13). Thus, the actor's process becomes integral to the meaning of 
the play itself. The problems an actor encounters are acting problems, in other 
words, problems involved in executing the actions of the role. It follows, then, 
that the plays must also be concerned with acting problems, with questions 
concerning the definition and execution of actions. Goldman's final twist is to 
suggest that the texts engage the concept of action thematically, that the plays 
are about action. To put it in a nutshell: Goldman's book investigates the 
interplay between the performance a text requires and the questions about 
action the text raises. 
Goldman's methodology follows logically from this approach. Since he 
examines plays from the standpoint of individual characters, he chooses six 
tragedies with eponymously defined protagonists—Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, 
Macbeth, Antony and Cleopatra and Coriolanus—md centers his analyses 
around these protagonists. This procedure recalls the practice common fifty 
years ago, epitomized by the work of A.C. Bradley, of centering the interpreta-
tion of a play around a discussion of a character, a practice that fell out of 
favor with New Criticism and which persists today primarily in certain styles 
of psycho-analytic criticism (such as Adelman's). Goldman embraces this 
practice without critical self-consciousness or acknowledgement of its potential 
limitations. Below, I will suggest that this procedure does not merely mitigate 
the force of Goldman's readings of the texts, but inhibits any attempt to 
represent the phenomenon of action that is central to his project. 
While the focus on individual characters is old fashioned, the project itself 
is quite timely, and aspects of it can be seen in other recent criticism and 
theory. David Grene, in a book published after Goldman's but that does not 
cite it, begins to sound very much like Goldman when, in a discussion of 
Richard II, he suggests that "there is a necessary fusion of the actor who is 
presenting Richard who is writing and acting the play for himself (41). 
However, Grene's fundamental concern is the way Shakespearean characters 
often represent themselves as actors, an aspect of the often noted self-referen-
tial theatricality permeating Shakespeare's plays. 
Unlike Grene, Goldman's objective decidedly is not merely to investigate 
the ways Shakespearean texts use theater as a metaphor. Two key aspects of 
Goldman's work represent important critical trends. The first is his interest 
in the concept of action. Many critics have shown interest in trying to 
understand and describe action in literary texts, and in making action, rather 
than image or argument, the focus of interpretation. Altieri's influential book 
Act and Quality exemplifies this concern with action: 
As my examples became more fully dramatic, the model of 
coherence they entailed was neither semantic nor, strictly speaking, 
conceptual, but instead required a scenic or imagistic sense of how 
actors might behave. We rely on a sense of action types, that lead 
back to dimension terms and require as their ground of intelligibility 
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a grammar developed precisely by meditation on the nature of 
actions and of possible choices in contexts. (Altieri 91-92) 
Of course, Altieri is still concerned primarily with action as it is represen-
ted in the text. A second aspect of Goldman's work is his interest in the 
interaction between performance qua performance and textual meaning. Such 
an interest in performance surfaces in very different forms in much current 
criticism, such as in Stephen Greenblatt's assertion that "Shakespeare's tragedy 
reconstitutes as theater the demonic principle demystified by Harsnett," and 
that "the force of King Lear is to make us love the theater, to seek out its 
satisfactions, to serve its interests, to confer on it a place of its own, to grant 
it life by permitting it to reproduce itself over generations'* (127). Harry 
Berger Jr. also grants performance an essential, though very different, role in 
the production of meaning: "The fury, splendor, and frustration can be 
experienced together only in performance; we have to feel the presence and 
pressure of the theatrical template, submit to its fair designs, in order to 
measure both its power and the shadowy counterforce of the power it 
represses" ("Psychoanalyzing," 229). However, the dialectic relationship 
between performance and text that Berger proposes is radically at odds with 
the relationship that Goldman proposes. 
The impetus behind Goldman's desire to privilege the actor's confronta-
tion with the text is perhaps closest to that behind the reader-response 
analyses that peaked a little over a decade ago, especially as practiced by 
Stanley Fish. To Fish, the act of interpretation is not the means to an end, but 
is the meaning of the work.2 For example, rather than suggesting that 
L'Allegro describes the pleasure that arises from an absence of responsibility, 
Fish proposes that "the experience of reading the poem is itself such a 
pleasure, involving just that absence; for at no point are we held responsible 
for an action or an image beyond the moment of its fleeting appearance in a 
line or a couplet" (118). The poem does not merely describe a certain kind of 
experience, but engages the reader in that experience. If Fish exemplifies a 
"reader-response" approach to criticism, in Moment by Moment by Shakespeare 
Gary Taylor exemplifies a "spectator-response" approach.3 For both Fish and 
Taylor, critical interpretation involves closely following an imagined encounter 
between reader and text (in Taylor's case, the performance text) as the 
encounter unfolds in time. Goldman's approach explicitly encompasses a spec-
tator-response approach when he suggests that he is interested in exploring 
three kinds of action, "the actions the characters perform; the action of the 
audience's mind in responding to and trying to possess the events it watches; 
and finally the actions by which the actors create and sustain their roles," (12) 
actions that he refers to as praxis, theoria, and poiesis, respectively.4 What 
makes Goldman's approach original and important, however, is his concentra-
tion of the last of these action-types, poiesis. Like Fish and Taylor, Goldman's 
approach focuses on the moment-by-moment interaction of an interpreter with 
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a text. Goldman's brand of "actor-response" criticism, however, is closer to 
Fish's approach than to Taylor's in its suggestion that Shakespeare's texts do 
not merely describe certain actions; the very process of interpreting the texts 
for performance will engage the actor in those actions. 
Each essay contains a core analysis that satisfies the form suggested by 
Goldman's critical model. The actor playing Hamlet must find a shape to 
Hamlet's seeming disparate actions, just as Hamlet must make sense of 
tangled events and actions; the actor playing King Lear must be able to 
express ever mounting levels of pain just as Lear must learn to cope with 
increasingly horrible events; the actors playing Antony and Cleopatra must 
convey a sense of greatness despite ignoble behavior, and Antony and 
Cleopatra also strive to project a sense of greatness that their behavior belies. 
Of course, Goldman never claims that the power of his paradigm is in its 
ability to generate generalizations of this kind. Such generalizations neither 
provide evidence for his model~at such a level of abstraction any play can be 
twisted to fit virtually any paradigm-nor do they provide especially striking 
insights about the plays. The promise of the paradigm is not as an engine to 
produce inductive principles, but as a strategy for discerning complex but 
elusive dynamics between text and performance. 
In practice, however, Goldman's paradigm seems unable to sustain a 
detailed discussion, and moves in and out of focus. Each essay makes an 
effort in the beginning to establish an argument that uses as a point of 
departure some problem that the text poses for the actor, but very quickly the 
focus strays and the actor fades from the picture. If one opens to the middle 
of any essay, one will encounter what appears to be a perfectly conventional 
analysis of a literary figure in a fictional world. 
For example, toward the beginning of the chapter on Othello, Goldman 
tells us that "the actor who plays Othello must find the cause of his cause" 
(47). Two pages later we are told that the actor must determine exactly at 
what point Othello becomes jealous (49). These assertions are virtually the 
only ones in the essay that make specific claims about the actor's performance. 
At a later point, Goldman refers to the actor when he explains how Othello 
creates an impression of exoticism by employing certain images. Goldman's 
argument inventories these images in detail, and concludes that "the action of 
the performer in the moments of successful exoticism allows us to experience 
Othello's personality as something palpably constructed" (62). Since the only 
action that has been specifically described is Othello's use of images, the use 
of the actor as nominal subject adds nothing to the content of Goldman's 
claim. The remainder of the essay considers the characters' (primarily 
Othello's) actions, feelings, and perceptions within the fiction-'Iago's words 
have filled Othello's mind with pictures of Desdemona and Cassio naked 
together" (53)-and draws general conclusions about Shakespearean 
tragedy-"by Othello at the latest . . . [Shakespeare] has arrived at a new 
understanding of the role of imagination in tragic action" (64). 
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Goldman's impulse to move away from the actor's terrain may stem from 
a realization that that terrain is hopelessly slippery. In order to engage his 
hypothesis that much of the text's meaning comes from what the text requires 
of the actor, Goldman must be able to identify what those requirements are. 
However, Goldman does not establish independent criteria for determining the 
text's requirements. Not only doesn't he provide general criteria, Goldman 
does not even offer ad hoc support for most of his specific assertions about an 
actor's needs. He explains that "to keep Coriolanus from being simply comic 
means finding the passion hidden in the chill rhetoric, the richness of spirit 
beneath the many signs of poverty" (150). But why should an actor necessarily 
want to prevent Coriolanus from being comic? And even if he does, is passion 
a guarantee against comic effect? Doesn't Malvolio become comic precisely 
at the moment he becomes passionate? And even if passion were one sure 
means to stifle comedy, would it necessarily be the only way; couldn't a clever 
actor, perhaps, find another, equally effective way? When Goldman asserts 
that the actor playing Hamlet will need to find a throughline of action for the 
part, he calls upon "the entire history of Hamlet in performance" to back up 
his claim (23). Yet he only cites one specific performer, John Gielgud, to 
represent that history. Moreover, he never explains why he rules out the 
possibility that a given actor, who has not internalized the Stanislavskian need 
for a "super-objective," might relish precisely the diversity and the unpredic-
tability of Hamlet's actions. 
Goldman sometimes tries to ground his claims about the text's demands 
on the actor by staying close to the seemingly objective, formal surface of the 
text. He observes that Coriolanus' speeches often exhibit a tortured syntax, 
and suggests that this syntax forces the actor to show that Coriolanus is 
thinking and that he cares about what he says. Almost any Shakespearean 
text, however, could provide evidence of some kind that the speaker is thinking 
and cares about what he says. More importantly, this inferential leap from the 
syntax to state of mind is very wide, and an actor could choose any of 
countless ways to account for and use the complex syntax. Perhaps, for 
instance, it reflects his indifference to, or even deliberate mockery of, fine 
rhetoric, or an anxiety, or distrust, concerning his ability to communicate.5 
The difficulty Goldman encounters sustaining this kind of analysis is all 
the more significant because he is a sensitive critic who has earned deserved 
recognition. His experience as both a poet and an actor manifests itself in the 
wealth of striking observations he offers about Shakespearean language, such 
as his suggestion that the words that dominate Lear's speech "seem to 
overflow, like an unexpected, wet animal, coming out of a river to snap or lap 
or slaver at you, or to block your path as the Une goes by" (80). His difficulty 
does not derive from a faulty application of his chosen critical method, but 
follows inexorably from the method itself, and it is precisely for this reason 
that his work constitutes a valuable case study. Goldman strives to pursue an 
interpretive strategy that rests on the recognition that dramatic texts are scores 
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for action, and as such are an integral part of a potential theatrical event. 
Such a strategy is key to collapsing the gap between dramatic theory and 
performance practice, and so for the field of dramatic criticism as a whole, the 
stakes are high for its success. 
I propose that Goldman's project is handicapped by an inadequate model 
of action. While he makes a general reference in his introduction to the 
literature on the philosophy of action, his text avails itself of none of the 
assistance that literature might provide. "We need not lose ourselves in the 
philosophical niceties," he explains (6). Indeed, his reference to the work done 
by philosophers seems to function primarily as a way for him not to define his 
notion of action rigorously for himself. As a result, he lacks a terminology to 
describe actions precisely, to distinguish between different kinds of action and 
their corresponding conditions of satisfaction, or to distinguish actions from 
other phenomena (especially from intentional states, such as attitudes, desires 
and intentions). Goldman presents "to snatch into thickness" {Macbeth), to 
"radiate nobility" (Antony and Cleopatra) and to "contemplate" (Hamlet) all as 
action descriptions on a par with one another, and with such concrete actions 
as "opening the door." 
Unfortunately, the one time Goldman draws on the philosophical 
literature specifically, he misreads it. In his discussion of Hamlet, Goldman 
describes J.L. Austin's distinction between stages, phases, and stretches: 
By stages he means the mental preparation that goes into the 
action-decision, planning, etc. Phases comprise the discrete physical 
doings that combine to make up an action of any size-the separate 
strokes of paint in the action of painting a wall. The stretches are 
the successions of effect, ultimately very remote, that any action may 
have. A political assassination in Serbia involves Europe in a war 
which leads to a revolution in Russia 'without which Dr. Zhivago 
would never have been written. (18-19) 
Thus for Goldman, stages, phases and stretches are three categories which 
describe the unfolding of an action, corresponding to the formation of an 
intention, the physical execution, and the results. In fact, for Austin, stages, 
phases and stretches describe, not three steps in one process, but three 
completely different kinds of distinctions one can make when discussing 
actions. Austin's term stages captures Goldman's reading of the three terms 
together, describing "the machinery of the act-the intelligence, the apprecia-
tion, the planning, the decision, the execution and so forth" (Austin 201). 
Phases, by contrast, describe the various physical actions that are performed 
sequentially as part of a complex action, for example each stroke of paint that 
goes into painting a picture. Finally, stretches are different descriptions that 
one can use to describe any given action. Thus, to use Goldman's example, 
one could describe the political assassination of the Archduke Francis 
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Ferdinand as an act of firing a gun, or of killing, or of avenging the honor of 
Serbia, or of starting World War I. Note that the concept of stretches is not 
coextensive with that of an action's results. Stretches are different levels of 
description for an action, some of which will be related to each other 
causally-e.g. firing a gun causes a man to be killed~and others will not—e.g. 
killing a man does not cause an act of revenge but constitutes the revenge. 
Moreover, not all results are stretches. One could not describe the 
assassination as "writing Dr. Zhivago," even though Dr. Zhivago was written as 
a result of the assassination. 
By misreading Austin, Goldman not only loses two potentially useful 
distinctions (phases and stretches), but much worse, he loses the very idea that 
when discussing actions, there are a number of different kinds of distinctions 
to make, that action is a multi-dimensional concept. He is left with a 
misleadingly reductive model of the one dimension he does extract from 
Austin: instead of Austin's deliberately open idea of stages (recall Austin 
tosses off five examples just for starters), Goldman was left with a rigid 
three-step model.6 Still, this distortion of Austin is the only conceptual 
apparatus Goldman introduces to describe actions with any specificity. And 
since in practice such stages are difficult to separate cleanly (as Austin 
recognized), Goldman abandons even these distinctions, replacing them with 
a term of his own~"spectrum"-that describes the entire life of an action. 
Ironically, Goldman uses Austin to justify exactly what Austin is trying to 
counter: vague and slippery discussions of action. 
While Goldman might have been able to make productive use of Austin's 
stages, phases and stretches (especially the latter, which more recent literature 
refers to as "accordion" descriptions7), the Austinian concept that would have 
proven invaluable to his analyses is the distinction between locution, illocution 
and perlocution that Austin sets forth in How to Do Things with Words. 
Goldman's conception of action provides no way to discuss the specifically 
performative use of language, and thus provides no way of distinguishing 
between what language does and what it means. Without a way of describing 
illocutionary force, Goldman must do all his work with reference to syntax (as 
in his discussion of Coriolanus) or vocabulary (as in his discussion of Macbeth). 
In a book that focuses on action as traced in dramatic language, this limitation 
is devastating. To observe the kind of specificity that the notion of 
illocutionary force would lend Goldman's project, compare Fish's analysis of 
Coriolanus (in "How to Do Things with Austin and Searle") with Goldman's.8 
Goldman is totally vulnerable to Derrida's attack on Austin (as Austin himself 
is not): he reduces action to just another kind of meaning.9 
I do not mean to suggest, of course, that one can not discuss action in 
Shakespeare without using the conceptual scheme provided in How to Do 
Things with Words. Indeed, the primary thrust of Fish's exercise is to 
demonstrate the limitations of using speech act theory to interpret individual 
literary works. What I am suggesting, however, is that some kind of conceptual 
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framework, some developed notion of how to identify actions and describe 
their force, is necessary. And whatever this framework may be, to have any 
hope of success it must take into account something that Goldman does not: 
context. Goldman's focus on individual characters removes action from its 
social context, stripping the drama from the dramas. The essays almost 
invariably conjure up a strange scene wherein an actor confronts a text in a 
void and tries to ascertain what the formal properties of the text tell him or 
her about the character. Even in the chapter on Antony and Cleopatra, the 
only one in which Goldman has two agents at his disposal, Goldman discusses 
two actors' parallel confrontations with the text, not their interactions with 
each other. 
The essential lesson that Austin offers—which one might also derive from 
the work of Wittgenstein or Heidegger among others-is that language is 
conventional action, gaining force only within a community that grants it force. 
The very act of structuring his analyses around individual protagonists, 
analyzing characters in isolation, sabotages any discussion of conventional 
actions (such as actions in language, or speech acts). Ultimately, Goldman's 
negligence of context denies him access, not only to action, but to character 
itself. As Burke's paradox of substance reminds us: "one cannot separate the 
intrinsic properties of a character from the situation that enables him to be 
what he is" (107). A clear definition of context is especially vital to Goldman 
since he is interested in discussing not just one, but three levels of action, and 
therefore at least three distinct contexts. 
The one point in the book at which Goldman does try to contextualize 
the action of the performance comes in his discussion of Macbeth. Goldman 
observes that the play was first performed soon after the failed Gunpowder 
plot almost eradicated the royal family. "The image of that catastrophe-an 
explosive manifestation of evil, absolute and as if out of nowhere, the sense 
that value and order could be wiped out in an instant-contributed, I think, to 
the investigation of evil that Shakespeare felt compelled to make in Macbeth" 
(98). Goldman seems unsure exactly how to use this historical information. 
Note his assumption of authorial intent here that produces the image of a 
compelled Shakespeare. The qualifier, "I think," becomes necessary because 
of the speculative nature of this invocation of authorial intent. "And so he 
began his play" (a narrative of the author in the act of writing) "with a terrible 
noise, followed instantly by a loathsome and, for the moment, incomprehen-
sible appartation: Thunder and lightning. Enter three WITCHES" (98). From 
this incident, Goldman draws the following conclusion: "I do not mean to 
suggest that the sudden thunder and menace at the beginning of Macbeth is 
anything like a deliberate allusion to the Gunpowder Plot, but an English 
audience recently familiar with the Plot would have been especially sensitive 
to the moral and metaphysical overtones of the opening scenes" (98-99). 
Inexplicably, Goldman uses this argument to support a proposal about how the 
scene should be staged today. 
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The force of this argument is to reconstruct the scene of Shakespeare's 
writing, identifying a "source" for the play in the conventional sense, and also 
to reconstruct the audience's consciousness at the original time of perfor-
mance. Goldman describes the historical scene of the text's original perfor-
mance tentatively, almost apologetically ("I think," "not anything like a 
deliberate allusion, but. . . ."), which is understandable, since the specifically 
Elizabethan audience has no place in any of the three levels of action that he 
has defined as the foci of his investigation. Goldman's underlying assumption, 
never confronted explicitly, is that the texts are fully present, timeless, 
accessible to modern-day actors. Thus, historical claims sit uncomfortably with 
him. However, Goldman's half-hearted introduction of historical material 
suggests that he recognizes the need to delineate some specific scene for the 
action he describes in order to justify the force he attributes to it. 
Compare Goldman's use of historical evidence with Greenblatt's in an 
essay like "Shakespeare and the Exorcists." While Greenblatt establishes that 
Shakespeare had read Harsnett's book (94), his argument would not be 
devastated if it were proven that Shakespeare had never heard of Harsnett. 
Greenblatt could merely assert, as he often does (for example in "Martial Law 
in the Land of Cockaigne"), that the text "represents characteristic Renaissance 
beliefs and practices" (130). He is not proposing a simple, one way relation-
ship between source and text; his point is not that an Elizabethan audience 
would be reminded of Harsnett's book as they watched King Lear. The source 
text functions as a scene within which the action of the King Lear is defined. 
Because the play functioned in a scene that included Harsnett's text and others 
like it, or even just a scene that could produce such texts, the play's force was 
defined in relation to those texts. The text could not help but enter into the 
"institutional negotiation" underway regarding theater, exorcism, imagination, 
Protestantism, Catholicism, etc. Greenblatt's strategy is clearly defined: he 
strives to resituate the text within its historical context, and so must carefully 
reconstruct that context as a Foucaultian archaeological layer. Insofar as the 
historical context is similar to our contemporary context, the Shakespearean 
text will still resonate for us, but (at least ostensibly) such resonance is entirely 
incidental to Greenblatt's endeavor.10 
Kenneth Burke provides a completely different way to establish a clear 
context within which to lend force to textual action, one not ultimately 
dependent on reconstructing the historical scene of performance. In his essay 
on "Coriolanus and the Delights of Faction," Burke examines the drama within 
the text itself, within a context defined in terms of the poetics of tragedy as 
Burke expounds it. (It makes little difference whether this poetics has any 
validity outside of Burke's imagination as long as it is adequately defined.) 
First Burke posits a scene of social tension between privileged and under-
privileged. While he suggests that this tension was manifested in Shake-
speare's time by rioting due to Enclosure Acts, he stresses that the tension is 
not peculiar to the Elizabethan context, but is latent in all societies (89). "If 
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we are going to 'dramatize' such a tension, we shall want first of all a kind of 
character who in some way helps intensify the tension" (82). That character, 
naturally, is Coriolanus: "Coriolanus is excessive in ways that prepare the 
audience to relinquish him for his role as scapegoat" (83). Finally, the other 
characters are defined to put the text into motion, to provide all the elements 
necessary for action to take place. "Aufidius is 'derived from' the character of 
Coriolanus. The conditions of the play set up Coriolanus as a gerundive, a 'to 
be killed/ and Aufidius is to be the primary instrument in the killing" (84). 
Ultimately, Burke is less concerned with the action of the characters, with 
the action mimetically represented, than with that of the representation itself. 
Indeed, the poetic action Burke describes is precisely that of the text producing 
a dramatistic structure, with the text itself functioning as the agent of this 
action. From this perspective, Coriolanus and Aufidius, the "to be killed" and 
the "instrument in the killing," function as agency, as objects with which and 
upon which the text acts. If one views Hamlet from such a perspective, the 
question of why Hamlet delays the assassination of Claudius drops out of focus 
and questions of why and how the text itself delays the assassination replace 
it. Among the possible actions one might consider would be the text's 
representation of a figure called "Hamlet," and it's attribution of certain 
desires, intentions, abilities, and limitations to this figure. At least as 
significant, however, would be the actions of the text that frustrate attempts to 
resolve the figure of Hamlet and that render any such attributions dubious or 
unstable. Moreover, the text's actions of delay may well be distributed among 
a number of characters; and the actions pressing for revenge might be 
distributed among these same characters. In other words, the boundaries that 
define and oppose poetic action might break up the text very differently than 
those that define and oppose "characters." Pursuing an investigation within the 
scene of action that Burke suggests, one could go on to consider myriad 
actions that have little to do with notions of "character" at all: the text's 
repetition of tropes; its use of conventional devices such as dialogue, 
stichometry, soliloquy; its compliance with and deviations from principles of 
genre. 
Insofar as he wants to pursue an investigation of the actions a modern-
day actor would be called on to perform, clearly Goldman cannot follow 
Burke's approach in defining context in terms of a poetics of tragedy. Imagine 
the futility of explaining to an actor playing Coriolanus that he is "a gerundive, 
a 'to be killed.'" By investigating the action of the text as a whole rather than 
the actions of autonomous characters, Burke's poetical grammar not only 
eliminates the authority of character, it removes the actor and audience from 
the scene of action altogether. And this situation would obtain in any poetical 
grammar, not just the poetics of tragedy defined by Burke. But given his 
concern with explaining a modern actor's interaction with the text, neither can 
Goldman follow Greenblatt in identifying the scene of action with the scene 
FALL 1991 39 
of the text's original composition. Still, like Greenblatt and Burke, Goldman 
does need to define some context for the action he examines. 
To pursue his project as he defines it, Goldman would need to contex-
tualize the texts in the scene of their performance. A text, naturally, will 
present very different problems and opportunities to different actors, depend-
ing on the actor's presuppositions about acting in general and Shakespeare in 
particular, as well as on the nature and degree of the actor's skills. The 
political, social and artistic ideas prevalent at the time and place of the 
performance, and the actor's (conformist or subversive) position with respect 
to these ideas, as well as with respect to the text itself, will also have con-
siderable impact on the nature of the actor's actions. 
Developing one's analysis within the context of performance necessarily 
would create a large degree of indeterminacy, which Goldman tries to avoid 
entirely. This indeterminacy would not, of course, be absolute; its limits could 
be established relative to the context of performance as it was defined. At the 
one extreme, one might investigate the problems the text would pose for a 
defined group of actors working in a specific time and place; at the other 
extreme, one might try to investigate the problems that the text might pose to 
any actors in any time or place. (This latter task, almost certainly, would be 
impossible to accomplish; but it is certainly possible to attempt, and the 
attempt could yield useful results.) In either case, or in any of the more 
promising cases in between, one would be exploring, not a single set of the 
actions that the text requires, but a range of potential actions that the text 
might suggest, allow, or provoke.11 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer gives implicit support to a critical method 
that delivers on Goldman's promise to elucidate the relationship between 
action and acting in dramatic texts: "The performance of a play . . . cannot be 
simply detached from the play itself, as if it were something that is not part of 
its essential being. . . . Here the methodological advantage of starting from 
the idea of play becomes clear. The work of art cannot be simply isolated 
from the 'contingency' of the chance conditions in which it appears. . . . A 
drama exists really only when it is played1 (104, emphasis added). 
Goldman eschews the kind of analytical work that a general exploration 
of a text in performance would entail, even within a narrowly defined 
performance context. Still, even as it stands Goldman's critical procedure is 
liberating insofar as it itself constitutes a kind of performance, a "reading" of 
the text in just the way an actor's performance is a reading of the text. 
Interpretation so conceived becomes something we (readers/actors) do to, or 
with, a text, rather than a process of extracting latent meaning that we claim 
has always been in the text. If one construes Goldman's book as presenting 
a particular performance, then one need no longer be concerned with the 
arbitrary quality of the "requirements" Goldman perceives that the plays 
impose on actors; each "requirement" represents one among many possibilities 
for action that the text makes available to an actor. (Even seen as providing 
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just one possible "reading," Goldman's approach suffers from a context too 
weakly defined to lend much force to actions.) Goldman, however, does not 
appear to accept his own readings as just one possible performance, or to be 
ready to accept a critical method that is as open as performance, one that 
really does play with a text in the context of its reading. 
One writer renowned for his espousal of just such a model of criticism, 
of course, is Barthes: The more plural the text, the less it is written before I 
read it; I do not make it undergo a predicative operation, consequent upon 
its being, an operation known as reading" For Barthes in his post-structura-
list stage, reading is acting. And indeed, Barthes goes on: "an / is not an 
innocent subject, anterior to the text, one which will subsequently deal with the 
text as it would an object to dismantle or a site to occupy. This T which 
approaches the text is already itself a plurality of other texts" (10). 
Goldman, by contrast, suggests that his interest in action is related to an 
interest in closing and in possessing texts: 
We talk about works of art because we wish to make them ours, to 
bring them within the boundaries of the self, to possess them in 
some way. Since we experience a play as a series of events 
occurring in time, any attempt to possess it requires a conception, 
such as the idea of action, which links separate events into a directed 
unity. (7) 
The use of action as a net within which to enclose and contain a text is just 
that described by Barthes when he describes the code of action, the "proairetic 
sequences," as instrumental in creating readerly, closed texts: 
[The proairetic sequences] are born of a certain power of the 
reading, which tries to give a sufficiently transcendent name to a 
series of actions, themselves deriving from a patrimonial hord of 
human experiences . . . when subjected to a logico-temporal order, 
they constitute the strongest armature of the readerly. (203-204) 
Goldman's ultimate desire is to unify, to close, and he is surprisingly up front 
about how his interest in action derives from this desire: "most of us have 
wished for a feeling of action in our lives (rather than, say, a feeling of 
disconnected activity)" (5). And the flip side of this desire is a fear of the free 
play of action. 
It is no wonder, then, that Goldman should inhibit the play of action in 
his own text. Similarly, his stable notion of character, and the centrality of that 
notion in his analyses, begin to make sense, since for Goldman "'character' 
occupies the same region of conceptual space as 'action.' Like action, i t . . . is 
a way of describing how being may be had, how inner events cohere and how 
they are connected to outer events" (164). Goldman gives voice to a fashion-
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able skepticism: "Man is no more than a beast if he does not act, but every 
action is such as a man might play, and efforts to act significantly regularly lose 
the name of action" (164). Ultimately, however, he puts himself in a position 
to summarize the relationship of act to agent for each protagonist with a pithy 
label (165). 
Alice Rayner has suggested that "in play . . . the act of playing creates the 
subject The agent does not determine the action but 'finds himself in the 
action" (18). Goldman's notion of character in performance is very close to 
Rayner's: "The type of self to which we pay most attention in the theater-the 
'character' presented by the actor-could be said to have a unique ontological 
status. It is not the personal self of the actor, but the self he creates by 
acting." But Goldman does not allow this theatrical self to play; he has deeper 
plans for it. For the theatrical self has a quasi-magical characteristic: "the gap 
between self and deed seems curiously to vanish" (10). Goldman thus can find 
in acting a unity with character denied in real life. "Through the actor . . . we 
experience the possession of a self as an action, in which we participate. We 
have the hero's being because the doing of that being is passed on to us" (167). 
This conception of character in performance is consistent with his description 
of the actor a decade earlier in The Actor's Freedom as "a particularly 
interesting and energetic human being who is not simply the actor and not 
properly the character, but the actor-as-character" (6). What lends acting its 
"terrific" power, Goldman suggests in that book, is that it represents a 
confrontation with an Other over which the actor gains control through 
imitation. 
Goldman's conception of character is symptomatic of a general preoc-
cupation with structural unity that affects every level of his analysis. This 
preoccupation has a number of serious consequences: 
1. It encourages a "closed" reading of the text that defines a fixed action 
and meaning for each line. 
2. It forces each of these individual readings to contribute to the de-
finition of a single action encompassing all of a character's actions. Thus, it 
closes off the very possibility of dialectic, or of actions that produce an open, 
problematic, unresolved effect, and demands that each action become 
absorbed within a unitary hierarchy. 
3. It produces a reductive notion of "character" defined in terms of the 
character's over-arching "action." 
4. It restricts the play of action in the text by forcing all actions to fall 
under a character's authority. Therefore it discourages an articulation of the 
complex relationship between the text and the actor, and obscures the 
distinction between what the text does to the actor, what the actor does with 
the text as an interpreter of the text, and what the actor does on behalf of the 
text in the name of a "character." Further, it prevents any consideration of the 
ways the text might act against the character who utters it (as in irony) or 
42 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
even, more radially, the ways the text might undermine the very image of a 
unified "character." 
5. It requires the invention of a unifying action that envelopes the play 
as a whole, and furthermore identifies this action with the singular action 
defined for the central character. This sense of a unifying action, in turn, 
invites (or perhaps presupposes) the illusion of an organizing authorial 
consciousness to lend intentionality to the textual act. 
6. Finally, Goldman's desire for unity encourages him to identify the 
action implied by his own critical approach with the action of the text itself. 
Since the focus of his approach is on actions, he strives to find a way to depict 
every play he examines as being about actions. This last effort represents a 
desire to unify his action as a critic, the action of the plays, and the meaning 
of the plays. 
In summary, when Goldman's project is situated within a larger critical 
context, it becomes clear that it represents only a small, though important, 
aspect of a general exploration of textual action. Critics have devised critical 
strategies that elucidate textual action within various distinct, though ultimately 
inter-related, contexts. New Historicism examines the force of a text within its 
originating context, and Burke's dramatistic approach examines the force of 
the actions that shape the text itself. Porter, like Fish in "How to Do Things 
with Austin and Searle," explores the force of actions within the fictional world 
of the text, while Taylor considers the force of stage actions on a theater 
audience, much as Fish considers literary texts within the scene of reading in 
his usual reader-response criticism. Berger has begun to explore the interac-
tion between the printed text and the performance text, positing a some-
times-dialectical relationship between the two. And Goldman begins to 
explore the complex dynamic between the printed text and the actor. But as 
long as our ultimate focus is on a tidy, unified, thematic prize, as long as we 
insist on reducing action to meaning, we will be unable to investigate textual 
action as a phenomenon in its own right. Goldman's book points to a 
promising and powerful new critical approach. We cannot follow the path of 
this new approach, however, if we insist on reaching old destinations. 
Stanford, California 
Notes 
1. See, for example, Champion, McGuire. 
2. Later Fish abandoned any notion of "the" meaning of a work: The business of 
criticism was not (as I had previously thought) to determine a correct way of reading but to 
determine from which of a number of possible perspectives reading will proceed" (16). 
Nevertheless, the process of reading remained instrumental in determining any meanings. 
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3. In Imaginary Audition, Harry Berger distinguishes between "the theatrical model of 
stage-centered reading" and "the literary model of stage-centered reading," invoking Taylor as 
a prominent exponent of the former and himself as the originator of the latter (xii). The 
theatrical model strives to represent the experience a spectator might have while watching a 
performance. The literary model, on the other hand, does not constrain interpretations to the 
psychological limitations that the conditions of spectating might impose, such as the rapid pace 
of production and limitations of short-term memory, but rather allows itself the "armchair 
reader's" luxury of "decelerated close reading" (143). Nonetheless, he insists that "plays are to 
be imagined not as poems, films, videotapes, or life slices but as plays, and as plays staged 
according to the conditions and conventions of the kind of theater that Shakespeare's plays 
represent" (143). 
4. Goldman's suggestion that "many difficulties of criticism arise from not distinguishing" 
these three kinds of action is ironic (12); after carefully making these distinctions in his 
introduction, Goldman has little recourse to them in his text. As a result, the three levels of 
description are often unclear and confused. 
5. Such efforts to derive specific cognitive content from formal qualities of text are 
reminiscent of E. L. Epstein's approach in "The Self-Reflexive Artifact." 
6. Goldman's misreading hurts not only his own book, but infects other people's work 
as well. Alice Rayner borrows Goldman's misreading of Austin and bases a critique of Austin 
on it (10). 
7. See Davidson (53). 
8. For a more extended application of speech act theory to Shakespearean criticism, see 
Porter's Drama of Speech Acts. 
9. See "Signature Event Context" for Derrida's critique of Austin. John Searle's reply 
appeared along with the English version of Derrida's article in the first number of Glyph; both 
of Derrida's articles, and a summary of Searle's, are reprinted in Limited Inc. These three 
articles have since drawn a great deal of attention as one of the first direct encounters between 
analytic philosophy and deconstruction. See Rorty, and Fish's "Compliments of the Author," 
for arguments that Derrida's critique, while applicable to Searle, does not give Austin sufficient 
credit. 
10. Greenblatt's use of historical sources to establish the general conceptual framework 
for an historical moment is very much like Montrose's in "'Shaping Fantasies': Figurations of 
Gender and Power in Elizabethan Culture." 
11. Michael Cohen has recently written a book that explores the options for interpreta-
tion that Hamlet presents to actors, working through the play scene by scene and juxtaposing 
numerous readings offered by actors in past performances with readings by critics and additional 
options he himself proposes. The book is refreshing in its agnosticism toward the possibility of 
identifying "correct" readings. Nonetheless, the book is uncritical about its assumptions about 
text, performance, and the relationship between the two. 
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